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Approved For Release 1999/09/02 : CIA-RDP79-01156A000100040001-3

21 March 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Geographic Research  
FROM : Chief, Geography Division  
SUBJECT : Facts Bearing on Establishment of a PI Capability at Langley

1. As discussed with you, I feel the establishment of a PI group at Langley capable of servicing the daily and hourly needs of DD/I analysts is plain common sense, like the past establishment of visiting FDD translators and a Map Library beachhead. What is open to discussion is the timing of the action and the size of the staff. Staff size may have to be determined by trial-and-error experiment. My contention, in any event, is that the proper time has arrived, that an on-site PI capability is already an urgent need. The DD/I should deal with it now before we have major trouble.

2. The Geography Division uses aerial photography in the following general categories of intelligence production: operations planning support; the Collation Project; special topographic studies for estimates, current intelligence, and White House support; and various tasks of scientific and economic intelligence support

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
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The Division constitutes the most experienced research group in the Intelligence Community for these tasks.

3. Our urgent need for a PI capability at Langley relates directly to the great increase in operations requirements. From 11 studies in 1960, Geography Division's support of operations planning has increased to 18 in 1961, 55 in 1962, and -- on the basis of the first quarter of the year -- a probable 90 studies in 1963. This work is particularly difficult to do well because it normally calls for great detail and precision, and very short deadlines. It requires, accordingly, extensive use of aerial photography. However, because of the remote location of CIA's photo interpreter and photo materials, much of

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the work has come to be accomplished in spite of rather than with the aid of PID. This situation has had increasingly serious effects on the quantity, quality, and timeliness of our output.

4. The work of the Far East and Western Hemisphere branches best illustrates the failure of present arrangements to supply effective PI support to the DD/I.

a. Since 1 August 1961 the Far East Branch has worked on 26 studies involving the use of aerial photography. All studies required technical backstopping by PID. In eighteen of the studies trouble developed out of the following causes: lack of area knowledge by the PI (who did not have the area specialist available for ad hoc consultation), omission of significant detail, mislocation of specific features, incorrect identification of specific features, questionable suitability of drop zones and safe area selections, inadequacy of PI time in terms of the task, reluctance of PID to use more than single-mission coverage for area analysis, and competition between D/GG tasks at Langley and other DD/I tasks at PID for use of the same photography. Overcoming these omissions, commissions, and conflicts in the use of photographic sources is the main problem facing this branch.

b. In a similar period, the Western Hemisphere Branch worked on 23 studies involving the use of aerial photography. PID's support was required for 16 of the studies, and trouble was experienced in all of the 16. The causes were fundamentally the same as those stated by the Far East Branch, but the branch chief's statement of them conveyed clearly what the analyst is faced with:

(1) Work is out-of-date by time we integrate it. Re-checking requires a new requirement because of problems at NPIC in selecting and procuring the film from their vault.

(2) Difficulties in communicating our needs on paper or by coded phone messages results in incomplete answers and subsequently need for additional work.

(3) Deadlines are seldom met, and we have no voice in priorities or the status of our work at NPIC.

(4) The shifting personnel situation in PID often means that we discuss problems with one PI but a different PI ends up doing the work without having heard our explanatory dis-

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cussions. End product is often inadequate and inaccurate.

(5) Differences in opinions and judgments on specific problems, [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] are extremely difficult to reconcile under the current "remote-control" system. The combination of their lack of substantive knowledge and our being unable to work daily with them on individual targets, causes awkward and time-consuming readjustments in conclusions. You can't delegate the "feel" of the subject.

At present (20 March 1963) the Branch has [REDACTED] which was of urgent priority with a two-week deadline in November 1962 and which is still not completed because of our inability to pry loose from PID the needed photo materials and advice. [REDACTED]

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5. PID essentially has 2 arguments to explain its bad service: (1) the PI's are grossly understrength and most of them are inexperienced -- e.g., everything will straighten out with time; (2) PID must give first attention to matters of "national priority" -- e.g., the DD/I must take its turn after the White House. The answer to these two arguments is as follows:

a. The inexperienced PI is the very one who should be sat cheek-by-jowl with area specialists, not allowed to work independently on White House, or any other, requirement.

b. Our experience of trouble in 34 out of 42 cases is symptomatic of the extra work the PI separated from his requestor is liable to go to on tasks other than simple mensuration. In addition there is unnecessary overhead involved in the PI's, independently, as in a vacuum, having to restudy the problem and the specific need within the problem before commencing work. Even then, considerable errors and waste effort may develop. My intelligence experience leads me to believe that the transfer to Langley of one PID photo interpreter would have the same effect as the addition of 2 PI's to the [REDACTED] group; at the same time it would eliminate faulty work.

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c. The filling of PID's staff vacancies will not eliminate the DD/I photo intelligence problem. The PI and the substantive

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
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specialist are mutually supporting and should work together closely. Only the responsible intelligence officer has an overall "feel" of the given intelligence problem. So long, therefore, as communications between him and the PI are a problem there will be major inadequacies in the quality and completeness of PI support. Equally important, the timeliness of PI response will continue to be pointlessly hampered by the physical separation between PI resources and the Langley analysts.

d. There is nothing unique, except for the thrill of the thing, in much "national priority" work which PID says is in competition with DD/I tasks. Actually, urgent requirements placed by the DD/I are just as much "national priority," and they serve directly or indirectly the same users. What has happened is that NPIC uses PID to suit its own special responsibilities, not those of the Agency overall. Thus while the Military Services have departmental PI resources in addition to their NPIC contingent, and also get departmental copies of essential photo materials, the CIA has no independent PI resources and can use essential photo materials only as NPIC chooses to loan them. I feel we should not and need not put up with this strange situation.

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